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Abstract 
This paper applies the concepts of hegemony and hybridity as analytical tools to help understand the 
structural changes taking place within the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries and beyond. The author points 
to the split identities of many post-Soviet societies and the growing appeal of solutions aimed at balancing 
Russia’s or the EU’s dominance as important factors shaping EaP dynamics. Against this background, he 
explores how the post-Soviet borderlands can find their place in a still hypothetical pan-European space, and 
free themselves from the tensions of their competing hegemons. The EaP is divided into those countries that 
signed Association Agreements with the EU and those preferring to maintain their loyalty to Eurasian 
integration. Bringing the two groups closer together, however, is not beyond policy imagination.  
The policy-oriented part of this analysis focuses on a set of ideas and schemes aimed at enhancing interaction 
and blurring divisions between these countries. The author proposes five scenarios that might shape the 
future of EaP countries’ relations with the EU and with Russia: 1) the conflictual status quo in which both 
hegemonic powers will seek to weaken the position of the other; 2) trilateralism (EU, Russia plus an EaP 
country), which has been tried and failed, but still is considered as a possible option by some policy analysts; 
3) the Kazakhstan-Armenia model of diplomatic advancement towards the EU, with some potential leverage 
on Russia; 4) deeper engagement by the EU with the Eurasian Economic Union, which has some competences 
for tariffs and technical standards; and 5) the decoupling of security policies from economic projects, which 
is so far the most difficult option to foresee and implement in practice. 
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Introduction 
The concept of hybridity is widely used to describe an important institutional feature of most 
of the post-Soviet regimes. Less studied are cultural elements of hybridity, mostly related to in-
between identities of borderlands located at the intersection of different civilizational (societal, 
religious, ethnic and linguistic) spaces and flows. This paper first discusses how cultural 
hybridity impacts upon institutional politics in the countries of the EU-Russia common 
neighbourhood. It then looks at how the EU and Russia as two major powers in the post-Soviet 
region deal with the hybrid – and thus unstable and dislocated – identities of their neighbours. 
The concept of hybridity not only to post-Soviet liminal countries, but also to EU’s and Russia’s 
policies. For example, Richard Youngs conveys the idea of a new EU “hybrid geopolitics … mixing 
offensive and defensive tactics, and of the Union using its distinctive tools aimed at deepening 
cooperation with Eastern Partnership (EaP) states, interdependence and political 
transformation, both more instrumentally and more variably to further immediate-term 
security interests. The category, i.e. of “hybrid geopolitics”, is ‘redux’ liberal in the sense of the 
EU using core liberal-cooperative practices in ways that are more selective and calibrated than 
in previous European policies, and superimposed with a layer of geo-strategic diplomacy.”1 In 
the meantime, EU-Russian relations may also be dubbed hybrid, in the sense that they are 
grounded in two overlapping systems of interaction – an old one inherited from the times of 
the Cold War, with hard security concerns and spheres-of-influence type of thinking, and an 
allegedly emerging new approach that Andrey Kortunov relates to the still hypothetical 
reinvigoration of “common spaces” or “regimes of communication”.2 
Unlike some realist voices, this paper assumes that the comeback to the Cold-War-style spheres 
of influence is not a viable option for the EU-Russia common neighbourhood. As the recent 
dynamics in the Russia-loyal Kazakhstan, Armenia and – to some extent – Belarus shows, 
institutional partnership with Russia does not preclude them from looking for better and 
deeper relations with the EU. One observes a similar shift towards an enhanced relationship 
with Brussels in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Moldova is a different example of searching for a 
                                                     
1 Richard Youngs, “Is ‘hybrid geopolitics’ the next EU foreign policy doctrine?”, London School of Economics and Political 
Science blog, 19 June 2017  
2 Andrey Kortunov, “Gibridnoe sotrudnichestvo - Kak vyiti iz krizisa v otnosheniyakh Rossii s ES”, Moscow Carnegie 
Center, 29 August 2017. 
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new balance in the EU-Russia conundrum: under Igor Dodon’s presidency, Chisinau overtly 
shows interest in freezing its previous commitments taken within its Association Agreement 
with the EU and build new bridges to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Of course, one 
should not project this demand for compromise and equilibrium to all post-Soviet areas, yet 
the examples given above attest to a need for more nuanced political arrangements to avoid 
further escalation of confrontation in the wider Europe.  
The search for new solutions should take into account some characteristics shared by the EU 
and Russia, despite the dissimilarities in their foreign policies. Both Brussels and Moscow have 
developed and put into practice certain combinations of inclusive and exclusive policy tools, 
and their hegemonic roles are doomed to remain incomplete.3 The idea of incompleteness – 
and, therefore, fluidity and volatility – of the post-Soviet transformation and the hegemonic 
roles of Russia and the EU in this process have been already discussed by analysts from different 
perspectives.4 In the context of my analysis, incomplete hegemony might be understood as a 
two-pronged concept. On the one hand, it suggests that there are no ‘natural’ borders 
delimiting the area of their normative (in the case of the EU) or civilisational (in the case of 
Russia) extension. These borders are shifting depending on different circumstances, including 
those beyond the reach of either Russia or the EU (for example, China’s policies are of the 
highest importance in this respect). On the other hand, both hegemonies are incomplete in the 
sense that neither the EU nor Russia can fully and comprehensively (i.e. institutionally, 
normatively, economically or security-wise) integrate their neighbours within their normative 
and civilisational projects. Thus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia demand much more – including 
the membership perspective – than the EU can supply at this juncture. The same goes for 
Armenia, which expects Russia to stop arms sales to Azerbaijan, and for South Ossetia and 
Transnistria, which wish – to no avail so far – Russia to absorb them. Concomitantly, each of 
the two dominant actors faces the necessity to meet elevated expectations of some of their 
neighbours, on the one hand, and set certain limitations in associating with them, on the other. 
This paper primarily focuses on the most recent experiences of those countries that are 
experimentally looking for carving out policy niches for their own subjectivities in a situation of 
EU-Russia institutional and political split. Some post-Soviet states (such as Armenia5) and non-
recognised territories (such as Transnistria6) wish to assert themselves as “bridges between 
Eastern and Western Europe”, yet these self-descriptions largely remain linguistic metaphors 
lacking practical content and substantiation. In manoeuvring between the two hegemonic 
projects, countries located in-between look for solutions and compromises that transcend the 
                                                     
3 Andrey Makarychev and Vlad Strukov, “(In)complete Europe vis-à-vis (in)complete Russia”, PONARS-Eurasia website, 5 
June 2017. 
4 See Andrew Wilson, “Partners for Life: Europe’s Unanswered ‘Eastern Question’”, European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 27 October 2017. 
5 Aram Terzan, “The evolution of Armenia’s foreign policy identity”, in Kornely Kakachia and Alexander Markarov (eds.), 
Values and Identity as Sources of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia, Tbilisi: Universal Publishing House, 2016, p. 148. 
6 Rory Maclean, “Heroic Adventures in Transnistria”, New Eastern Europe, No. 4 (IX),2013,  p. 158. 
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binary either-or logic conducive to deep political rifts and ruptures, and it is these endeavours 
that are of primary interest to the present analysis.  
Two questions in particular are addressed at this point: 
1) How far might these in-between identities and the concomitant policy practices lead 
these countries and how sustainable will these hybrid models will be in mid-/long-run? 
2) Will the multiple areas of overlapping EU-Russian policies, interests and jurisdictions 
require Moscow and Brussels to change their policy tools and power resources?  
In tackling these questions, most of the attention is focused on Moldova and Armenia, but with 
reference to the experiences of Georgia and Ukraine as well. 
The empirical base includes primary (official documents, statements and speeches) and 
secondary (media) sources in English and Russian languages, as well as interviews with experts 
(policymakers, scholars, civil society activists, journalists) conducted during fieldwork in 
Georgia (n=10), Ukraine (n=10), Moldova (n=10) and Armenia (n=10) in the summer of 2017. 
1. Hybridity in the Common Neighbourhood 
This paper defines hybridity through a set of characteristics of post-Soviet transformation that 
allow for co-existence of different political features and cultural trends, including those that in 
certain contexts might be seen as contradictory to each other. The post-Soviet region in this 
respect may be addressed as a peculiar and paradoxical combination of archaic forms of social, 
economic and cultural practices, on the one hand, and a post-modern de-ideologisation (the 
proverbial end of ‘grand narratives’), with the ensuing fluidity and uncertainty of most of the 
forms of political identification. It is this mix of seemingly hardly compatible types of policy 
practices and power relations that defines the high volatility of political processes in many of 
these countries, and multiple U-turns in their foreign policy orientations. Examples are 
Moldova’s fluctuation from a ‘soft balancing’ between Moscow and Brussels under Vladimir 
Voronin’s presidency to the drastic shift towards explicitly pro-EU policies in 2009, followed by 
the rise of pro-Russian forces and the subsequent presidency of Igor Dodon since 2016. Georgia 
too went through a series of U-turns from the nationalist leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in 
the early 1990s to a more balanced presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, followed by the ‘Rose 
Revolution’ and the ascension to power of Mikhail Saakashvili, whose trajectory in a matter of 
years transformed Georgia from a pragmatic partner of Moscow in 2004 to Russia’s enemy in 
2008. The rise and fall of the “Orange coalition” in Ukraine, its electoral defeat by the Moscow-
friendly Viktor Yanukovich and his deposition as a result of the EuroMaidan of 2013-14 attests 
to the high turbulence in Ukrainian politics as well, which the Ukrainian political analyst 
Volodymyr Gorbach terms an “unfinished revolution”7 – an idea that again, albeit in a different 
context, points to the incompleteness of many political characteristics of the post-Soviet 
transformation. 
                                                     
7 Volodymyr Gorbach, “Незавершена революція”, Ukrainskiy Interest web portal, 1 December 2017. 
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Important elements of these transitory complexities are relatively vague and blurred political 
loyalties. Being considered as a Moscow-loyal, President Voronin ultimately refused to sign the 
Kozak memorandum drafted in the Kremlin as the basis for the settlement of the conflict in 
Transnistria. By the same token, President Shevardnadze, being very close to Moscow in many 
respects, left open doors for cooperation with NATO and the EU. Moscow was able to prevent 
the pro-EU drift of yet another ally Viktor Yanukovich, but at a high price of forcing him to 
abandon the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU and thus provoking a deep political crisis 
in Ukraine with global security consequences.  
In a general sense, the high political volatility in the post-Soviet countries can be explained by 
the complexities of their nation building. More specifically, the most substantial element of this 
complexity is the disharmony between political identity as a system of loyalties and sympathies, 
ethnicity, the institution of citizenship and religious affiliations. For example, Georgia and 
Moldova reveal meaningful contradictions between the idea of (re)building nation states and 
religious loyalties largely influenced by (and associated with) the Russian Orthodox Church 
(ROC). Besides, in Moldova one may see disconnections between political identities and 
citizenship in the sense that the possession of Romanian passports does not necessarily define 
pro-Russian or pro-EU sympathies of its holders.  
An illustrative example of the post-Soviet hybridity is Georgian identity: “de-Sovietisation is part 
of Georgia’s efforts to join the EU”8, but Georgian sympathies towards Stalin, with their strong 
nationalist roots, are quite strong in the society as well. This bifurcation is exacerbated by the 
precarious European identity of Georgians: “During the different periods in its history, Georgia 
has been the part of the Persian and Ottoman Empires, the Mongolian and Russian Empires, 
and the Soviet Union; but Europe has hardly ever been involved. Thus, saying that Europe is a 
natural habitat for Georgia and that its people aspire to go ‘back’ to Europe, is only loosely 
related to the actual course of Georgian history.”9 As a Georgian expert argues, European 
identity in this country is not based on “cultural appeal, values and norms; rather people are 
drawn to the economic prosperity that is perceived as a result of a deeper cooperation between 
Georgia and the EU”.10 As for the political meanings of the institution of citizenship, there are 
two competing – yet co-existing - narratives in Georgia – a liberal, pro-Western one grounded 
in civic identity, and “ethno-religious national narrative”11 based on the values of ethnicity and 
religion. 
Against this backdrop, to properly analyse the post-Soviet reality on the ground, a new 
understanding of hybridity is needed– not only as a characteristic of political systems, but also 
                                                     
8 Ana Dabrundashvili, “Shadows of Joseph Stalin”, New Eastern Europe, N 3 (VIII), 2013, p.45. 
9 Ibid. 
10 See Levan Kakhisvili, “Accounting for the “selfless” self-perception among the Georgian public”, in Kornely Kakachia 
and Alexander Markarov (eds), Values and Identity as Sources of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia, Tbilisi: Universal 
Publishing House, 2016, p. 77. 
11 Tamar Pataraia, “The civic dimension of Georgian national identity and its influence on foreign policy”, in Kornely 
Kakachia and Alexander Markarov (eds.), Values and Identity as Sources of Foreign Policy in Armenia and Georgia, Tbilisi: 
Universal Publishing House,2016,  p.94. 
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as an in-between cultural positioning with meaningful political effects. As any type of diversity, 
cultural hybridity may have various effects – it might be conducive to the building of a civic 
nation where ethnic identity would not be the key criteria of belonging to the nation, but it can 
also lead to separatism, which is particularly dangerous if supported or ignited from the 
outside. 
Speaking about how in-between identities trigger institutional effects, one needs to see a wider 
picture of the post-Soviet political space. Most of these countries have all the institutions 
central to democracy (elections, separation of powers, civil society organisations, the media), 
but their functioning is a far cry from European standards. All of them consider their national 
identities European by culture, history and geography, yet the political distance from EU norms 
and standards of democracy might be quite substantial. This ambiguity expands the space for 
manoeuvring: Armenia – a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) – continues to develop relations with the EU and NATO; and 
Moldova – a country that signed an AA and a DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement), and was a pioneer in enjoying a visa-free regime with the EU – under Dodon’s 
presidency is increasingly leaning towards Moscow.  
Ukrainian and Georgian hybridities manifest themselves in a symbiotic co-existence of strong 
pro-European drive – basically engendered by a consistent desire to break away from Russian 
patronage – with the resilient attraction of the nation state as the locus of power and the 
embodiment of ethnic/national authenticity. In particular, Georgia’s identity combines a clear 
sympathy and penchant towards Europeanisation (presupposing liberal reforms) with the 
strong attachment to Orthodoxy with its obvious conservative underpinnings. Yet the nation-
state model of governance, with the inherent conservative momentum, contradicts the 
overwhelmingly liberal logic of EU-led supra-national integration. The Georgian Orthodox 
Church, the most trustworthy institution in the country, shares a lot in its conservative and 
Western-sceptic rhetoric with the ROC, which only adds to the ambiguity mentioned above. In 
Ukraine the ROC, widely referred to in the official discourse as the Church of the intruding 
country, is a major Orthodox institution whose parishes outnumber those of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church of the Kyiv patriarchate. A specific element of hybridity in Ukraine is the 
proliferation of the practices of dual citizenship as an effect of policies of neighbouring 
countries – Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Russia aimed at distributing national passports or ID 
cards (Karta Polaka) in addition to the pre-existing Ukrainian citizenship.  
Moldova is an interesting example of a country where the redrawing of borders in the past (i.e. 
geopolitical and territorial reshuffling) caused strong hybridising effects in cultural and political 
domains. The country’s strong connections to both Russia and Romania unleashed deep splits 
in national identity.12 In the meantime, Moldova is an illustrative story of the fragility of 
                                                     
12 Rumer, Eugen, “Moldova between Russia and the West: a Delicate Balance”, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, 23 May 2017.  
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‘successful’ Europeanisation13: the electoral victory of the Alliance for European Integration 
could not drive this country away from the oligarchic ‘state capture’ and corruption scandals. 
The presidency in Moldova – as exemplified by Igor Dodon’s tenure – is not a consolidating 
institution, but rather a divisive one. To this one should add the spill-over effects of the events 
in Ukraine – an anticipation of possible political destabilisation and the growing uncertainty 
when it comes to security.14 As a result, not much room is left in Moldovan politics for value-
based policies – the country incarnates a post-Soviet, post-ideological and post-normative 
regime of power, with pragmatic considerations (economics, finances and security) trumping 
any possible ideational allegiances. The widespread practice of double citizenship adds to the 
existence of multiple zones of shifting loyalties and dislocated identities. For example, it is 
imaginable that Moldovan holders of Romanian passports would not necessarily be pro-
European when it comes to their voting preferences. This type of post-political and even post-
national citizenship is primordially a matter of practical convenience, which distinguishes 
Moldova from, for instance, the Baltic states where – especially in Estonia and Latvia – post-
Soviet citizenship was closely associated with political loyalty to the nation states that regained 
their independence. 
Religion is another factor that adds to the hybridity of Moldovan identity. The role of the ROC 
in the country is huge: most of the parishes in Moldova are controlled by the Moscow 
Patriarchy, which, according to the testimonies of many Moldovan experts, is more a political 
than a theological institution, and is widely known for using religious ceremonies to propagate 
the doctrine of the Russian world. Therefore, clashes between the ‘pro-European’ and ‘pro-
Russian’ standpoints hide a much more complex picture of numerous conflicting affiliations and 
disconnections involving issues of ethnicity, religious affiliation and citizenship. 
Armenia – sharing with Moldova an in-between manoeuvring in search for its own system of 
multiple balances – is different from the three countries that signed AAs and strengthened their 
relations with the EU through visa-free agreements in at least one important respect: it did not 
lose territory to separatists. On the contrary, it supported the de-facto second Armenian state 
in Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory that before 1991 was administratively part of Azerbaijan. 
Against this background, Armenian foreign policy choices are more geopolitical than normative, 
which is predetermined by its complicated neighbourhood, including locked borders with 
Turkey and Azerbaijan. In these conditions the EU appears as one of few options to balance 
Russia’s influence. In the Armenian discourse there is a feeling of belonging to a cultural space 
of Europe from which the Armenian nation state is distanced, if not detached geographically.15 
As an interviewee in Yerevan put it, “we are Europeans even if Europe does not know that”. 
In the meantime, Armenian mainstream discourse vehemently discards any meaningful anti-
Russian attitudes in this country, preferring to see them as marginal and politically insignificant. 
                                                     
13 Dovile Suslite (ed.), “Экономические Вызовы, Стоящие Перед Украиной и Молдовой на Пути в ЕС”, Eastern 
European Study Center and Foreign Policy Association, Chisinau, November 2015, p.16. 
14 Glavkom, “Угроза пророссийского переворота в Молдове. К чему готовиться Украине?”, 13 January 2017. 
15 Alexandr Iskanderian, ЕАЭС - не интеграционный проект, это форма подтверждения лояльности России, Yerevan: 
the Caucasus Institute, 22 November 2015. 
INCOMPLETE HEGEMONIES, HYBRID NEIGHBOURS: IDENTITY GAMES AND POLICY TOOLS IN EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES | 7 
 
Moreover, as another interviewee in Yerevan said, “we are not Georgians – we don’t 
contradistinguish Russia and Europe”. For Armenia, Russia is a security guarantor, while the EU 
is an economic partner. Within the CSTO, Armenia tried to offer its experience of international 
peacekeeping: “The self-sufficiency stems from Armenia’s expanding capacity to participate in 
peacekeeping operations separate from its role as a member of the Russian-dominated CSTO 
and distinct from its security partnership with Russia”.16 In the security terrain, this is exactly 
what defines Armenia’s attempts to diversify its external communication under the condition 
of heavy dependence on Russia. 
2. Hybrid hegemonies: The EU and Russia 
The academic literature is replete with realist and geopolitical approaches to a plethora of 
issues pertaining to EU-Russian interactions in the common neighbourhood area. A Russian 
expert, for example, argues that the EU is driving towards a more geopolitical – as opposed to 
pragmatic – approach to its eastern neighbours.17 However, the EU’s and Russia’s policies 
towards their common neighbours, being undoubtedly hegemonic, in many respects remain 
incomplete, which may be understood as a structural impediment to hegemonic impositions 
from either of two major power centres – Moscow and Brussels – due to the hybrid nature of 
societies forming the neighbourhood area. By the same token, EU and Russian policies 
themselves might be approached from the perspective of hybridity, which in this specific 
context means a complex structure of hegemony without one single logic behind it. 
From a practical perspective, the EU and Russia have their own advantages. The EU acts 
through a variety of channels, thus combining diverse forms of influence – through the 
mechanisms of official agreements, state-based policies and the multiplicity of non-state actors 
involved, including foundations, professional associations, think tanks, and so forth. Russia, for 
its part, is stronger in non-democratic environments dealing with opaque and often corrupt 
interest groups. This section discusses the EU’s and Russia’s hegemonic strategies in their 
complexity and multiplicity, and from the viewpoint of their hybrid nature. 
2.1 Europeanisation as a hegemonic strategy 
The hybrid structure of political identities and affiliations in countries of common 
neighbourhood is a serious challenge to the EU’s policy in its eastern neighbourhood. In the 
meantime, Brussels’ incomplete hegemony stems from the very limited nature of EU external 
projection, which puts a premium on norms, values, rules and institutions, and intentionally 
downplays the role of coercive instruments.  
One of the lessons of EaP implementation is that the EU failed to duly understand that elite 
groups in some post-Soviet countries rhetorically used pro-Europe/pro-democracy narratives 
                                                     
16 Richard Giragosyan, “Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Armenia”, Providing for Peacekeeping website, November 
2015. 
17 Andrey Deviatkov, “Восточное партнерство ЕС: геополитика побеждает прагматику?”, Evrazia Expert, 19 June 2017  
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for attaining three practical goals having very little to do with Europeanisation. First, in their 
role as EU political partners and promoters of EU-compatible agenda, they aimed at receiving 
immunity and impunity from criticism, if not a carte blanche, from the West for their actions. 
As Andreas Umland argues, the clan-like system in Ukraine reproduces itself under European 
slogans.18 Second, many post-Soviet elites were eager to obtain palpable material advantages 
from the EU and its member states, including new funding. Third, they need EU backing for 
boosting their independence and autonomy – that might contravene EU’s ‘post-sovereign’ 
approach – “in order to ease their dependence on Russia”.19 As seen from the elites’ 
perspective, this strategy was quite rational and effective in the short run. However, the long-
run result was widespread disappointment in societies not only with local political elites due to 
multiple corruption charges, but also with the EU that supported these elites and turned a blind 
eye in the meantime on their wrongdoings. 
Evidence of the EU’s lack of institutional resources in projecting its normative power eastward 
is most apparent in recent changes in electoral laws in Armenia, Moldova and Georgia. Despite 
the dissimilar trajectories of these changes, none of them was aimed at improving the quality 
of democratic governance, but – as consensually understood by policy experts – at securing the 
power base of the ruling elites.20 In the words of the EU’s official statement concerning the 
2017 Moldovan changes in electoral rules, “we continue to share the view of the Venice 
Commission and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights that the 
proposed changes raise serious concerns regarding effective democracy in the current political 
context”.21 Other political voices in Europe equally condemned the new Moldovan legislation.22 
Thus, it is hard to establish a solid and unambiguous connection between EU policies – including 
the visa-free decision23 – and domestic transformation in Moldova. On a more general note 
one may say that the pro-EU enthusiasm of 2009, when the Alliance for European Integration 
came to power in Chisinau, transformed in a matter of a few years into disappointment and 
disillusionment that created a fertile ground for Russian interference. As observed by Moldovan 
interviewed in Chisinau: “The EU is viewed through the prism of allegedly pro-European 
politicians who monopolised the representation and interpretation of the idea of Europe… All 
these years since 2009 the EU tried to dissuade us from criticising the government formed upon 
the Alliance for European Integration, and convince us ‘to give them a chance’.” 
                                                     
18 Andreas Umland, “Сегодня клановая система в Украине воспроизводит себя под европейскими лозунгами”, 
UkrLifeTV, 27 June 2017.  
19 Oscar Pardo Sierra, “No man’s land? A comparative analysis of the EU and Russia’s influence in the Southern 
Caucasus”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44, 2011, p.242. 
20 “Change of Electoral Systems in EaP Countries: Bolstering Dictators or Causing Maidan”, Moldovan Politics, 29 June. 
2017. 
21 Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn, “Statement by the HR/VP Mogherini and Commissioner Hahn on the 
amendments to the electoral legislation in the Republic of Moldova”, European Union External Action Service, 21 July 
2017. 
22 European People’s Party, Moldova’s New Political System – a Blow to Democracy, EPP Press Release, 20 July 2017. 
23 Denis Cenusa, “Moldova after three years of visa-free regime with EU and new European realities”, IPN News Agency, 
18 April 2017. 
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After the 2009 electoral success of the Alliance for European Integration, the EU aimed at 
“building Moldova into the success story” of Europeanisation, constantly praising the pro-EU 
government as effective and “European”. However, this didn’t prevent the society from huge 
disappointment with Europe, as expressed by another Moldovan interviewed: “This sounds 
unbelievable, but in the process of system transformation, the return to the previous system 
and subsequently a refusal to further pass on power is more probable.”24 Many Moldovan 
intellectuals themselves recognise that the country is getting more conservative and 
patriarchal, and its low living standards stimulate mass migration.25 Institutions of the state are 
subdued to practices emerging from the shadow, if not criminal, businesses that operate widely 
throughout the country (neutralisation of opponents, cleaning of political field, blackmail, 
money laundering through sophisticated financial schemes, etc.). Another hot point is the 
debate about amendments to the Moldovan legislation complicating the operational activity of 
local NGOs: “The proposed provisions are contrary to the AA between the Republic of Moldova 
and the EU, which encourages the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, including civil 
society organizations, in developing policies and reforms in the Republic of Moldova”.26 
Against this background there are strong voices arguing, in the words of one interviewee, that 
“power in Moldova has been captured by Vlad Plahotniuc, who is neither a democrat nor a 
reformer and who, under the cover of false pro-European rhetoric, is petrifying the weaknesses 
of the state”.27 Plahotniuc tried to pragmatically monopolise the pro-European flank of 
Moldovan politics, but by so doing he, as some analysts think, turns Moldova further away from 
European standards,28 which creates fertile ground for Russia.29 As a Russia-loyal journalist in 
Moldova mentioned in an interview, “the European vector was non-existent in Moldova… 
There are only business interests here, no ideologies at all” – a post-political milieu that is quite 
convenient from the vantage point of projecting Moscow’s interests. 
In Armenia, with all its dissimilarity from Moldova, the EU faces the same type of trouble 
attesting to the very limited nature of EU influence over domestic transformation. The shift 
from the semi-presidential system, with elections part proportional representation/part first-
past-the-post, to a parliamentary republic with a full proportional representation system, is 
widely assessed as a “reform from above”, and even as a “counter-revolutionary putsch from 
above aimed at creating a one-party state”.30 For example, the Armenian government received 
from the EU €7 million for the purchase of special electronic equipment used during the 
parliamentary elections, yet afterwards refused to engage with the EU-initiated debate on the 
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quality of the electoral process, accusing the EU envoy in Yerevan of interference in Armenia’s 
domestic affairs.31  
Brussels, however, has been obliged to adjust its policies to the new commitments and 
obligations undertaken by Yerevan after its refusal to sign the AA. In 2013 the Armenian 
government proposed a shorter version of this document as a compromise, but the EU initially 
rejected this text, insisting on an ‘either all or nothing’ principle. After that Brussels adopted a 
more flexible approach and agreed to renegotiate the agreement, which was ultimately signed 
in November 2017. 
2.2 Russia’s Neighbourhood Strategies 
Russia’s toolkit for dealing with its ‘near abroad’ looks more diverse than the EU’s. It includes 
two pillars – Eurasian integration and the idea of the Russian World, which embraces ethnic, 
religious and linguistic dimensions – that are absent in the case of the EU. Besides, as Russia’s 
support for military insurgency in eastern Ukraine made clear, the Russian World ideology 
might have a substantial military component – again, non-existent in the EU. Nevertheless, as 
many experts conclude, the overtly militarised imperial Realpolitik brings scant palpable results 
to Moscow.32  
Indeed, from the geopolitical perspective, Russia’s hegemony in the near abroad looks like a 
series of policy improvisations lacking any coherent or consistent design. The Kremlin 
vociferously proclaims the South Caucasus its sphere of interest, but in the meantime has 
withdrawn its military infrastructure from Adjara (Georgia) and Quabala (Azerbaijan). Moscow 
was fully aware of the negotiations that Viktor Yanukovich was conducting for years between 
its satellite Ukraine and the EU on the AA and DCFTA, but did nothing to clarify the way Russia 
understands its interests were being affected by this agreement. The same happened with 
Armenia: Russia abruptly reconsidered its de-facto disregard of Yerevan’s intention to use the 
EaP for qualitatively boosting relations with the EU, and at the very last moment started 
pressuring President Serzh Sargsyan to prevent the AA from materialising. Moreover, Moscow 
– despite its insistence on being taken seriously when it comes to post-Soviet neighbours – 
failed to capitalise on the EU’s readiness to conduct the trilateral EU-Russia-Ukraine 
negotiations. Due to inadequately justified and artificially elevated demands from Moscow, the 
talks ultimately failed in 2015, and the trilateral format discredited itself, largely to Russia’s 
disadvantage. 
As a result of this chronic inconsistency, Russia is gradually losing influence in what it considers 
its ‘sphere of vital interests’. Paradoxically, Russia – whose government tends to see the world 
basically through a geopolitical prism – is in some respects outperformed by the EU, an actor 
that by no means perceives itself in geopolitical terms. The vulnerability and weakness of 
Russia’s policies to a large extent stem from its geopolitically self-defeating policy of aligning 
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with secondary actors and simultaneously losing ground in its relations with more important 
ones. Geopolitically, relations with Georgia are more important than with Abkhazia and – 
moreover – South Ossetia; relations with Chisinau are more important than with Tiraspol or 
Komrat, and relations with Kyiv are more important than with Donetsk or Luhansk. The same 
logic, by the way, can be applied to Russia’s European policies: Moscow in fact exchanged 
normal and stable working relations with power holders in France and Germany for directly 
identifying Russia’s interests with second-ranking (at best) anti-establishment forces. The 
priority given to often marginal and peripheral groups seems to be a major factor compromising 
Russia’s geopolitical positions in a wider Europe. As a result, Russia lacks an effective long-term 
strategy in its so-called near abroad. Russia can contribute to splitting societies along the pre-
existing divisive lines (for example, in Moldova), but it can’t efficiently play a consolidating 
game, basically due to the lack of a strong normative appeal. 
The deficiency of Russia’s normative strategy became particularly evident in August 2008, when 
it recognised the two break-away Georgian territories. This political gesture was an abrupt 
departure from the previous strategy that Russia tried to implement within the global 
framework of its normative stance, which included two main pillars. First, Russia acted out of 
its consensually recognised status as the successor of the Soviet Union, which initially was 
interpreted in Moscow more from the viewpoint of Russia’s special responsibilities rather than 
extraordinary rights. In accordance with this logic, Russian troops in Georgian territory received 
international legitimacy as peacekeepers. Secondly, Russia consistently insisted on the 
inappropriateness of instigating independence movements and fuelling separatism within 
sovereign polities. In accordance with this logic, Moscow not only considered Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia legal parts of Georgia, but also imposed sanctions upon them. 
In August 2008, both pillars were either destroyed or significantly reconfigured. By applying 
military force, Russia first shifted its discourse from responsibilities to the right to intervene. 
Second, by recognising the separatist entities, the Kremlin forfeited its previously earned 
normative capital and the reputation as the most consistent advocate of the principle of 
territorial integrity of states. The trajectory that Moscow has chosen to follow has driven it from 
the principled non-recognition of break-away territories to recognition and then – in 2014 – to 
the annexation of Crimea where separatism was almost non-existent before Russia’s 
interference. Russia’s collective self, both national and imperial, started symbolically 
appropriating territories beyond national borders. Crimea and Novorossiya are two recent 
examples of this proclivity to refer to neighbouring lands as allegedly central – if not constitutive 
– of Russia’s sense of identity. This possessive feeling, being a sign of a deep non-self-
sufficiency, can be extended to the entire Ukraine, a country that many Russians consider as 
their subaltern, yet – paradoxically – in the meantime as an indispensable element of the 
proverbial Russian World.  
From a global geopolitical perspective, this devolution produced disastrous effects: from a 
member of the G8 and a strategic partner of both the EU and – even though only verbally – 
NATO, Russia turned into an object of harsh international criticism, economic and political 
sanctions, and found itself in a situation of political isolation vis-à-vis the West. It is this situation 
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that Russia exploited to a full swing debunking the ‘European choice’ of its neighbours as a 
rhetorical cover for interest-based group policies of personal enrichment. Moreover, Russia 
entangled itself in a knot of unresolvable controversies: it wishes to de-legitimise the West from 
a normative perspective, but in the meantime is eager to legitimise its Ukraine policy among 
Western governments and opinion-makers. 
A good example of the geopolitically dichotomist thinking is the following statement made by 
a Moscow-based policy analyst: “The crucial question is whether we consider Georgia 
completely lost for Russia and the Russian world. If this is the case, the best strategy would be 
to arrange a referendum on incorporation of South Ossetia into Russia and then to fend off 
with a well-equipped border against an inimical country. But if this is not the case, we should 
think of a strategy of extended dialogue with Georgia, keeping Abkhazia and South Ossetia as 
Russia’s allies”.33 The question is still pending.  
In Moldova, Russian policy has developed under the impact of two political failures. The first 
painful episode was the fiasco with the Kozak memorandum that was ready for signing but at 
the very last moment rejected by the President Vladimir Voronin under US pressure. The 
second episode of unsuccessful policy was the mission of Sergey Naryshkin, who in December 
2010 visited Chisinau in his capacity as the head of presidential administration. Naryshkin’s 
unofficial arrival was meant to create a left-centric coalition of the Communist Party and 
Democratic Party under Russian mediation.34 These two examples show Russia’s weakness as 
a mediator in political clashes in Moldova. Yet even in Transnistria, as some journalists suppose, 
“Russia in fact decides close to nothing. It preferred to detach itself from the development over 
there. The pro-Russian orientation in Transnistria is a matter of imagery. In the future it can re-
orient to the EU, if needed”.35 For example, Russia did nothing to avoid conflict between the 
‘Sherif’ group and Evgeniy Shevchuk in Tiraspol, preferred not to interfere and observed at a 
distance Shevchuk’s escape from Transnistria to Chisinau in June 2017. Even with a pro-Russian 
president as the head of state, Moscow can do little when Russian diplomats are expulsed from 
Chisinau, or the Moldovan Foreign Ministry declared Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin 
persona non grata. Therefore, Russia does not always meet the high political expectations of 
its clientele and effectively interfere.  
Many analysts refer to these shortcomings to make a case for the fragility of Russia’s hegemonic 
(im)positions in Moldova; some authors argue that Moscow lacks a policy of its own, instead is 
simply trying to fill the vacuum left by Brussels.36 My argument is different, however: Moscow 
has too many policies that might contradict and potentially block each other. 
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Russia’s first policy boils down to ‘disciplining’ Moldova by creating impediments for bilateral 
cooperation (such as sanctions) and then lifting them as a political resource, thus investing in 
relations with loyal politicians (such as Igor Dodon) giving them a chance to publicly claim that 
they can deal with Moscow and tackle the most controversial issues annoying Moldova. The 
two cases in point are restrictions imposed against Moldovan wine in the Russian market and 
complications for Moldovans working in Russia. The rise of Dodon as a political leader is 
illustrative of this type of policy: in his capacity as leader of the Socialist Party, prior to his 
presidency, he met in Moscow with the head of Russian Migration Service Konstantin 
Romadanovsky with whom he has settled the judicial issues concerning dozens of hundreds of 
Moldovans working illegally in Russia. By taking a permissive stand, Russia polished the political 
credentials of Dodon in Moldova and simultaneously tried to diminish the importance of the 
visa-free agreement with the EU by showing the attractiveness of the Russian labour market.37 
Later Russia lifted its earlier reservations and agreed to accept Moldova’s participation in two 
free trade areas – but only when Dodon came to power in Chisinau.38 Moreover, Dodon 
received a chance to directly associate himself with Putin as a strong leader who was the only 
foreign head of state attending the May 9 military parade in Moscow in 2017.39 
Secondly, in communicating with Chisinau, Moscow plays the Eurasianist card, and does it in 
two different ways. It supported pro-Eurasianist sympathies in Transnistria and Gagauzia in 
2014, implying a possible integration with the Russian-sponsored Eurasian Union.40 Another 
channel for Eurasianist ideas in Moldova is the activity of several Russian-affiliated 
organisations (such as the local branch of the Izborsk Club41) and individuals (such as Yuriy 
Roshka, the most active promoter of Alexander Dugin’s ideas in Moldova). The Eurasianist 
discourse as articulated by Dugin himself in Moldova is a hybrid appeal that contains both right-
wing/conservative and leftist ingredients. This Eurasianist blend of stereotypes and 
misperceptions includes statements that can be easily disproven empirically – such as, in 
particular, the case of Dugin’s assertions that the EU completely disregards issues of social 
justice, or that the populations of Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are eager to leave the EU. But 
this discursive mixture has more consumers – and therefore more chances for circulation – in 
normatively de-politicised societies, which tend to be politically inert and insensitive to value-
based narratives. Paradoxically, Dugin’s and Roshka’s appeals to “salvaging the souls” as the 
top policy priority for the “Eurasian alternative” might have some audience in post-political 
(even post-democratic) social and cultural environments, with disillusionment in the material 
benefits of European democracy and the search for an alternative illiberal identification. 
Positively assessing the operation of the Izborsk Club in Moldova, Roshka, a leading Moldovan 
Eurasianist, called for a hybrid trans-ideological consensus, based on two pillars that share anti-
liberal views: “genuinely left and genuinely right/conservative intellectuals and politicians”. On 
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the left side Roshka imagines issues of social justice and anti-colonial struggle against the US-
based oligarchic elite, while on the right-wing flank, he sees the accentuation of cultural and 
civilizational issues. In his account, Moldova can be a pilot project of a Russia-patronised 
“Eastern Civilization”.42 On a different account, he claimed that “there are no more left and 
right, only different shades of patriotism”.43 This makes the Eurasianist message sent to 
Moldova a hybrid of leftist resistance to capitalism (anti-oligarchic rhetoric and references to 
“people’s interests”) and civilizational conservatism/traditionalism (including anti-secularism 
and anti-nationalism). 
At this point, the most interesting is Dugin’s and Roshka’s insistence on “Moldovan-Romanian 
common cultural and philosophic legacy” as a basis for the national conservative revival (“We 
are interested in strengthening Moldovan and Romanian identity as part of a single 
civilization.”44). This argument, first, contradicts the logic of supporters of federalisation in 
Moldova45 based on the stimulation of anti-Moldovan and anti-Romanian discourse in 
Transnistria. Second, premium place by Eurasianists on the Moldovan-Romanian cultural, 
civilizational and religious unity does not sit well with the proponents of the Russian World in 
Moldova. In this sense the Russian World represents a separate policy (or a set of policies) 
aimed at culturally distinguishing Transnistria as an island of Russian language and culture 
endangered by the so-called Romanisation.46 Dodon’s openness to discuss a return to Cyrillic 
transcription of the Moldovan language47 in this context is not only a cultural, but a political 
gesture as well. 
Yet, of course, each of the policies briefly introduced above – the “Eurasian pathway” or the 
Russian World – is not only about narratives and public debates. Many Russian discourse-
makers play more than one role in Moldova. For example, Alexey Martynov, Director of the 
Moscow-based International Institute of Newest States, who in 2015 was detained at the 
Chisinau airport and denied entry to Moldova, is known less as a specialist in policy analysis and 
more as a person close to authorities in Tiraspol, which explains the fact that he has been 
awarded a medal of honour in Tiraspol.48 In a similar way, the authorities in Chisinau banned 
Sergey Mokshantsev, Director of the local branch of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies 
(RISI), from entering Moldova. His organisation has a strong reputation of being in close touch 
with the Russian government and intelligence community.49 RISI directly called upon the 
Kremlin to recognise the independence of Transnistria.50 It is telling that the opening of the RISI 
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Center in Tiraspol was staged not as an academic, but rather as an openly political event 
attended by the head (bashkan) of Gagauzia Mikhail Formuzal, the head of Transnistrian 
government Tatiana Turanskaya and the Foreign Minister of the unrecognised republic Nina 
Shtansky, along with the Defence Minister Aleksandr Lukianenko, the archbishop of Tiraspol 
and Dubossary Savva, as well as representatives of social movements “Motherland – Eurasian 
Union” and “Our Serbia”.51 
The Priznanie (“Recognition”) Foundation funded by Moscow is another hybrid actor that 
serves more as a partisan platform for influencing public opinion and giving the floor to a wide 
range of Russia-friendly speakers – from the former President Vladimir Voronin52 to the former 
head of Transnistria Evgeniy Shevchuk – than as an independent unit.53 Priznanie operates as a 
testing ground for identifying the most promising Moldovan politicians worthy of support from 
Moscow, and in the meantime as a litmus test for their loyalty to Moscow.54 The foundation 
also pledged to support those Russian-language media in Moldova that face so-called 
discrimination,55 thus in practice investing its resources in one of the Russian World’s policy 
priorities.  
In Georgia, Russia uses a similar set of policies, relying on a local clientele group of Russian 
loyalists reproducing Putin’s discourse and customising it for local conditions.56 These tactics 
include over-securitisation of the situation on the ground (for example, related to hyper-
dramatisation of conflictual elements of relations with Turkey) and the propagation of Kremlin-
compatible anti-Western narratives.57 Another important pillar of the Moscow-translated 
discourse are the constant appeals to geopolitical pragmatism, as opposed to embracing EU-
generated norms and values. In particular, using its support groups and individual speakers in 
Georgia, Moscow claims that Russia’s retreat from Georgia would automatically mean a fertile 
ground for Turkish expansion,58 and that NATO has much less to offer Georgia than Russia.59 
Russia is portrayed as a friendly country where many Georgians in the past made their names 
and careers, which adds a strong nostalgic element to Russian propaganda.60 
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Armenia in this context differs from Moldova and Georgia, since it has chosen to exchange its 
AA with the EU with the enforced membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. Nevertheless, 
with all institutional connections to Moscow, Armenian political debate includes issues 
questioning the efficacy of its pro-Eurasian turn: “Russia faces negative consequences of the 
fall of world oil prices, paralleled by Western sanctions, which led to the 39% drop of 
remittances from Armenians working in Russia, and to an 18% drop in export volumes. 
Therefore, the anticipated benefits of Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union 
have not so far materialised.”61 Moreover, the April 2016 resumption of hostilities with 
Azerbaijan boosted the voices in the Armenian society who are doubtful of the expediency of 
security cooperation with Russia: “It was Aliev who received endless compliments and 
assurances in eternal friendship. No one considered appropriate to court Yerevan: Armenia has 
no place to go anyway”.62 Thus, Russia’s role in the security sphere in Armenia is not 
undisputable.63 Armenia should not count on Russia too much as a key strategic ally, according 
to Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan.64 He warned that “[n]ot only did Russia not 
come up with clear support towards Armenia, but high-level Russian officials including Deputy 
Prime Minister Rogozin made statements that Russia would continue to provide Azerbaijan 
with modern assault weaponry, part of which was actively used against Armenian forces during 
the four-day military escalation.”65 Some Armenian political analysts deem it dangerous to rely 
only on Russia, and call for diversification of foreign policy partners to include the EU and Iran.66 
As for the reverberations of the Russian World ideas in Armenia, the space for this policy is very 
limited, which became evident in the very critical reception given to a proposal made by the 
deputy head of the State Duma to introduce Russian as the second official language in 
Armenia.67 One Armenian politician dubbed as a “mental disorder” a suggestion by the Russian 
Minister of Education to use Cyrillic in all CIS countries,68 which attests to the strong resistance 
by the Armenian polity to attempts at Russification.  
3. Options and scenarios 
Russia – supported by realist thinkers in the West – claims that the only alternative to spheres 
of influence would be continuing military conflicts in the whole post-Soviet area. Some authors 
deem that Russia’s legitimation of spheres of influence has already yielded fruit: “Allegedly, 
Russia has an indirect veto right on the EU’s and NATO’s expansion policy in its near abroad and 
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no longer tolerates Western expansion in the former Soviet states.”69 Yet, as this paper has 
argued, it is the phenomenal hybridity of the post-Soviet states and societies, along with hybrid 
forms of interaction and blurred lines of identification that make the practical implementation 
of spheres of influence and other realist schemes impossible. This is exactly what constitutes 
the most dramatic element of the whole story of post-Soviet transition: most of the post-Soviet 
countries as they exist nowadays can’t be smoothly integrated with either the EU or Russia. 
Both dominant actors are incapable and often hesitant to fully absorb or incorporate these 
countries, thus making their political trajectories even more complicated. The territorial 
division of a wider Europe into spheres of influences looks from the vantage point of this 
analysis impractical. The crux of the problem – pace John Mearsheimer – is not Western discord 
with Russia’s insistence on a new division within a wider Europe, but the impossibility of any 
form of territorial partitions and divisions in principle. The language of political realism – with 
Russia’s “orbits”, “doorsteps” and “backyards”, the revitalisation of the concept of ‘buffer state’ 
and the explicit ‘right-wrong’ distinction70 – is desperately obsolete, at least in this part of the 
world. The same goes for the advocacy of status-quo policy and the idea of ‘red lines’ as its 
conceptual substantiation.71 
Neither the EU’s ‘complete hegemony’ in the form of full membership for EaP states, nor 
Russia’s monopoly over its near abroad seems to be a feasible policy option. Equally 
unimaginable is Russia’s open and unequivocal identification with the basic norms of 
Europeanisation. Under these circumstances, several other options can be discussed. 
Option 1 is the maintenance of the unsatisfactory status quo, with alternating cycles of the EU’s 
and Russia’s reactions to each other’s policies. Thus, NATO’s indecision at the Bucharest 
summit of April 2008 was perceived by Moscow as a sign of weakness that (indirectly) paved 
the way to Russia’s military operation against Georgia in August of that year. This war 
intensified the EU’s launch of the EaP, which a few years later led to Russia’s heavy pressure 
over Kyiv (and Yerevan). Consequently, the EuroMaidan was a response to Ukraine’s (temporal) 
deviation from the European route, followed by the Russia-instigated anti-Maidan, the 
annexation of Crimea and EU sanctions against Russia. This scenario implies indirect 
communication through mutual reactions to the moves of each other: Russia and the EU in this 
case build their policies via constant reciprocal retaliations. 
This option is basically guided by the logic of Russia’s intransigent view of any forms of EU 
institutional presence in the post-Soviet space as “not just as contradicting (Moscow’s. – A.M.) 
interests, but as being bluntly anti-Russian… (which – A.M.) only increases Russia’s concerns 
about the EU’s ambitions and actions in the post-Soviet space, including through targeted EaP 
states. Despite the obvious scope for economic linkages, chances are low to see in the 
foreseeable future the post-Soviet space as a space of EU-Russia cooperation. In the future, 
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sharp competition and protectionism will determine economic relations between Russia and 
the EU in the post- Soviet space.”72 Under this narrative of confrontation, Russia will continue 
looking to debilitate the EU by supporting non-mainstream parties in Europe (mainly national 
conservative, but also leftist), thus attacking European unity and solidarity. Concomitantly, in 
its post-Soviet neighbourhood Russia will invest in relations with the most Eurosceptic and anti-
European parties and groups.  
In this situation, the EU might pursue a policy of ‘benign neglect’ of the Eurasian Economic 
Union, indirectly obliging Russia take ever greater commitments and obligations towards 
common neighbours, which ultimately might lead to a cul-de-sac and Moscow’s ‘imperial 
overstretch’. The EU might ultimately profit – though indirectly - from the vicious circle of 
financial responsibilities to its satellites that Moscow is already trapped in. Indeed, in the 
absence of functional and effective soft power, Moscow needs to offer purely material bonuses 
and advantages to its partners and interlocutors, which eventually might be burdensome to the 
Russian budget, if implementable at all. 
This scenario, however, still implies a danger of escalating the mutually containing moves and 
entanglements in an endless series of reactions and reciprocation. Therefore, the remaining 
scenarios will be grounded in a different logic that does not envisage immediate and direct 
ripostes to the other party’s policies, but rather, envisages positive interaction between 
Moscow and Brussels.  
Option 2 is a comeback to the trilateral format and direct talks on conditions and mechanisms 
of compatibility between implementation of EU-led and Russia-led integrative processes. Some 
political leaders in post-Soviet countries verbally support this option, yet so far, all attempts to 
coordinate the EU’s and Russia’s policies have failed whether in a bilateral format (the 
Meseberg memorandum on Transnistria signed by Russia and Germany in 2010), in regional 
organisations or within ad-hoc trilateral working groups (such as the EU-Russia-Ukraine 
negotiations73) –. In the latter case, Russia’s strategy ultimately led to the discontinuation of 
tripartite talks, which demonstrated that Moscow didn’t care much about the future potential 
of this format and was not seriously interested to reproduce it in other situations (in Moldova 
or Armenia, for instance). Russia did stay in touch with its EU partners over coordinating their 
policies in Eastern Europe, yet this cooperation had clear limits, mostly set by the Russian side. 
Perhaps the continuing EU-Russia consultations on the Western Balkans in the context of EU 
enlargement can serve as a potentially better example that can be replicated in the common 
neighbourhood as well.74 
Yet, even without formal negotiations, there is still some – although modest in scope – space 
for compromises. For example, Moscow de facto accepted the perspective of a parallel 
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functioning of different “norms of technical regulations” in Moldova, and reduced its demand 
to Chisinau to abstain from introducing discriminatory measures against Russian agricultural 
producers and the exchange of customs information.75 In the security sphere – when it comes 
to Donbas, Transnistria or Nagorno Karabakh – Russia and the involved EU member states are 
in direct touch with each other, which might be regarded as a specific form of a multilateral 
format. 
Option 3 can be titled the “Kazakhstan-Armenia model” in the sense that these Russia-loyal 
countries have signed – apparently without open conflicts with Moscow – cooperation 
agreements with the EU, which however are consistent with their previous commitments vis-
á-vis the Eurasian Economic Union. Following Armenia’s example, Belarus also started to talk 
about a new format of relations with the EU. “Signing an agreement on partnership and 
cooperation is a matter of a short-term perspective”, said the Foreign Minister of Belarus 
Vladimir Makey.76 And Azerbaijan too in early 2017 resumed negotiations with the EU on a new 
partnership agreement.77  
Kazakhstan was the first post-Soviet country to move in the direction of balancing its Eurasian 
commitments with strengthening the EU vector. Luc Devigne, Deputy Managing Director for 
Europe and Central Asia in the European External Action Service, mentioned that “the EU’s 
relationship with Kazakhstan has never been any stronger or any better”.78 This success story 
is grounded in a carefully crafted policy of the government of Kazakhstan to create a positive 
image of this country in the West not only as a stable partner of European and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, but also as a modernising economy open to foreign markets. The Kazakhstani 
government used a variety of tools to create a basis for its acceptance in Europe as a Central 
Asian leader and to lobby for boosting investments and technology transfer from the EU and 
particularly from Germany. The Eurasian Club in Berlin and Eurasian Council on Foreign Affairs 
were instrumental in advertising and promoting Kazakhstan in the EU. Given Central Asia’s 
interest in the EU, the examples of Kazakhstan and Armenia potentially might be replicated, for 
instance, by Kyrgyzstan which also looks for its own balancing mechanisms when it comes to 
relations with major foreign actors. 
The 2017 Armenia-EU agreement on enhanced partnership (CEPA) was almost consensually 
characterised as a “win-win” compromise suitable to Yerevan, Moscow and Brussels. Russia’s 
mainstream discourse looks quite constructive as well: it not only accepts the very idea of 
‘external diversification’ preventing the reduction of foreign policies “to a diametric choice 
between Russia and the West, or a competition of value systems”, but also praised Armenia for 
“becoming a space for dialogue between Russia and the EU” that rejects an “either/or” 
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approach to integration, and moves both Moscow and Brussels in a “both/and” direction.79 
Within this discourse Armenia can be portrayed as a country that “now achieved what Ukraine 
and Georgia could not: the benefits of both EEU and EU integration”.80 
In the Armenian discourse on the CEPA agreement, the key words are “geopolitical 
pragmatism”, “manoeuvring” and “realism”, although many voices in Armenia celebrated the 
agreement as a further drift away from Russia’s patronage81 and as an alternative – rather than 
a supplement – to the EAEU. CEPA – apart from its institutional effects – became a turning point 
for legitimising a Russia-sceptic discourse grounded in a number of arguments replicable 
beyond Armenia. Russia is treated as an internationally sanctioned country, which prevents it 
from investing in partners’ economies and offering reduced gas prices, notwithstanding earlier 
promises. It is a mainstream point in Armenian discourse that the country primarily needs what 
Russia can’t supply – modernisation, structural reforms and anti-corruption measures. Due to 
new customs duties, Armenia’s trade with Georgia and Iran is tending to decrease, weakening 
trans-border cooperation. Armenian experts openly complain about the lack of any Russian 
assistance in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; moreover, Russia is accused of selling arms 
to Azerbaijan, which, as seen from Armenia, leads to further militarisation of the region and 
contradicts Russia’s role in the Minsk Group. Apart from that, Moscow is widely seen as an 
inefficient soft power, with a poor record of successful cultural and humanitarian projects.82 As 
one can see, the list of claims toward Russia is quite long, and CEPA became an important point 
for articulating a strategic alternative to the status of Yerevan as Moscow’s satellite, with 
possible spill-over effects in other Russia-dependent countries. 
Option 4 would be the launch of a process of EU’s recognition of the Eurasian Economic Union 
as a legitimate interlocutor (at least) and (perhaps in the long-run prospect) an economic 
partner. This scenario, as it is discussed nowadays, looks feasible under two conditions. The 
first one is de-politicization of the whole spectrum of European relations from both sides, which 
in particular implies the bracketing out of the Russia-Ukraine military conflict from the political 
agenda. Secondly, this option requires the recycling of the old doctrine of “engaging Russia” – 
in fact, a new edition of Wandel durch Handel that unfortunately didn’t work earlier. 
However, this option has many proponents in Europe. For example, the recent Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung report claimed that the EU “perhaps had gone too far in its actions and failed to consult 
with Russia on an equal basis. Instead, the EU presented Russia with a fait accompli… 
(Therefore. – A.M.) the EU should involve Russia as a neighbour with its own interests in 
negotiations about a vision for this region’s future… Russia’s interests in the region are to be 
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recognized and taken seriously”.83 This approach is similar to multiple voices coming from 
Moscow: “The Ukrainian crisis shows that there is an urgent need to identify viable and 
acceptable-to-all strategies for economic integration across the triangle EU-EaP-EAEU… The 
“Lisbon to Vladivostok” working group of the German business is regularly conducting meetings 
with the Chambers of Commerce of Poland and Ukraine to convince them to support deepened 
cooperation between the EU and the EAEU”.84 However, the advocacy for this policy of 
rapprochement is based on empirically questionable premises: “Recently, Russian leadership 
has been sending clear signals that it is committed to economic transformation and seeks to 
diversify and reform the rent-dependent and corruption-ridden economy… In the long run, 
economic liberalization and convergence (or at least closer cooperation) with the EU may also 
promote political liberalization”.85 Apparently, the demand for modernization and structural 
reforms is much more articulated in Armenia or Kazakhstan than in Russia. What is even more 
important is that option 4 is not easy to imagine, unless there were some de facto slide towards 
the 'Transnistrianisation' of the region of Donbas, signalled by a true cease fire, withdrawal of 
heavy weapons and safe opening for cross-border movement of people and trade.86 
Arguably, the rationale for a potential policy change towards EAEU should be related not to 
“engaging Russia” (time and again), but in stimulating alternative visions of regionalism that 
hypothetically can counter-balance Russia’s predominance and prevent the Russia-centric bias 
in this organization. In this respect Kazakhstan plays the pivotal role. In particular, “Kazakhstani 
Eurasianism does not view itself as a geopolitical space distinct from both Europe and Asia, but 
as embodying the positive meeting space between Europe and Asia, drawing on both”.87 In 
cultural sphere Kazakhstan has declared the transformation of its alphabet into Latin graphics, 
thus clearly distancing from the idea of Russian World to which the Kremlin strongly committed 
itself. 
Against this backdrop, option 4 makes sense basically as a policy of establishing some kind of 
working relations with EAEU with a premium put on the role of Kazakhstan, as mainly Brussels’ 
deal with Astana rather than with Moscow. The choice of Kazakhstan as EU’s main Eurasian 
interlocutor might be duly appreciated by Astana and supported by analytical and expert 
resources of such organizations as Eurasian Club and Eurasian Council on Foreign Affairs. In the 
meantime this type of policy would imply that the EU is more sympathetic with the Kazakhstani 
vision of Eurasianism rather than with its Russian (more imperialist) version, which appears to 
be only logical in the circumstances of Russia’s detachment from most of the policy tracks 
earlier developed in conjunction with the EU. Unlike Russia, Kazakhstan never downgraded the 
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importance of modernization and economic openness88 as structural conditions of its 
engagements with Europe, and pursued a security policy – with de-nuclearisation at its core89 
– its Western partners find responsible and contributing to peace and stability. 
Option 5 seems to be the most complicated one. It implies that the EU and Russia would refuse 
to compete with each other over establishing control of specific territories, and try to find more 
innovative non-territorial (or trans-territorial) forms of responsible influence over their 
common neighbours. This scenario requires functional division of areas of interest and 
responsibility between the two dominant actors. More specifically, this option would 
necessitate decoupling security affairs (where Russia might play the first fiddle) from economic 
integration (where the EU might become the engine), and multilateral policies aimed at 
avoiding clashes between the two.  
Of course, option 5 looks unrealistic without a mutual structural adjustment of EU’s and 
Russia’s policies in economic and security spheres. It also seems to be unfeasible in situations 
when Moscow wouldn’t accept the EU as the most attractive economic and normative model 
for most of the common neighbours. In the meantime, the chances for this scenario would 
increase with the stronger commitment of Russia’s neighbours to a neutral status, along the 
lines of Finnish, Swedish or Swiss non-bloc security policies, which would debunk Moscow’s 
obsession with the alleged threats triggered by a hypothetical NATO enlargement. 
Potentially – in a long run – this scenario might lead to more sophisticated networking relations 
of engagement and communication in the post-Soviet space. As Clifford Kupchan posits, “the 
time for formal association mechanisms that clearly define which countries are “in” or “out” of 
a given regional grouping has passed. Today, strategies such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) that allow states to flexibly join parts of an initiative without necessarily committing to it 
irreversibly, foregoing competing offers, or integrating all aspects of their socio-political life 
have the upper hand”.90 Should this model be considered as beneficial for the EaP, it might 
open new chances for EU’s other engagements in the East, including Central Asia and China. 
Of course, some of these options may overlap and form more intricate policy combinations. 
The Kazakhstan–Armenia model might in due course boost chances for an EU-EAEU deal, which 
could bring Eurasia-loyalists more in line with EU economic rules and technical standards 
without politically antagonising Moscow. Moreover, at certain point there might be chances to 
balance the EU-centrism of a (still potential) wider European economic area by the important 
roles that Turkey and the post-Brexit UK can play in its reification, which might correspond to 
Russia’s vision of a multipolar Europe without damaging EU’s positions.  
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